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Research on FDI Regulation
Framework at the Background of
“BRI” Implementation
Li Feng*
Abstract:

Alongside “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) are mostly developing countries,
with complicated geopolitical relationships and poor business environments.
Therefore, how to promote Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) cooperation
prudently is a critical issue faced by Chinese government and enterprises. On one
hand “BRI” is an initiative and cannot establish new organization to coordinate
investment disputes, and on the other hand FDI regulations are at crossroad:
lacking multilateral mechanism, restructuring regional rules and requiring
upgrade of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). In order to protect Chinese
overseas investment and prevent potential “BRI” risks, it’s indispensable for
China to take actions in FDI regulations: in multilateral level to propose global
FDI rules and long-term mechanism, in regional level to innovate rules by
methods of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), in bilateral level to upgrade BITs and
promote liberalization and facilitation, and in unilateral level to deepen domestic
reform and pilot new rules.

Keywords: FDI, “BRI”, Risk Prevention, FDI Regulations

S

ince it was proposed, the Belt and Road Initiative has witnessed increasing
Chinese investment cooperation with the countries along the Belt and
①
Road, and has made certain achievements. However, the Belt and Road is a
proposal, an initiative that is not entitled to establish an organization to facilitate

* Li Feng, associate professor, School of International Economics, China Foreign Affairs University.
* Foundation item: This paper is a staged research result of “Studies on China’s Mechanism of Overseas Investment Risk Prevention in
the Context of the Belt and Road Initiative” (16LJC012)—a research program sponsored by Beijing Social Sciences Fund.
① Being open, the Belt and Road Initiative includes but is not limited to the scope of the ancient Silk Road. However, this paper only includes 64 Belt and Road
countries (excluding China) as research samples. For a complete list, please see http://beltandroad.hktdc.com/tc/country-profiles/country-profiles.aspx, May
22, 2016.
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investment. Meanwhile, in FDI area we are faced
with many problems, such as lacking multilateral
mechanism, restructuring regional rules. In order
to pragmatically and effectively boost investment
cooperation alongside BRI, we have to take full
advantage of current FDI regulations and make
constant innovations in FDI new rules.

1. Attributes and disadvantages of
China’s foreign direct investment
in the countries along the Belt and
Road
Nowadays the world economy is depressed
and China is also under pressure. Under the
circumstance, China’s move to advance investment
in the countries along the Belt and Road is beneficial
and indispensable. However, opportunities and
challenges co-exist in the process. Despite fast
growth, several problems still exist in China’s
outward foreign direct investment, for example, it is
disproportionately concentrated on certain countries
and industries.
1.1 Rapid growth with great potential
According to statistics released by China’s
Ministry of Commerce, from 2003 to 2014, China’s
outward foreign direct investment flowed into 58
countries along the Belt and Road and amounted to
USD 72.03 billion. This was a booming increase,
from USD 200 million in 2003 to USD 13.66 billion
in 2014, with an average annual increase of 46.7%.
Despite the fast growth, China’s direct investment in
the countries along the Belt and Road only accounts
for a small proportion of China’s overall outward
foreign direct investment, merely 11.1% in 2014,
which means great potential for increasing Chinese
direct investment in the countries along the Belt
and Road. As the Belt and Road Initiative is further
advanced and more investment projects break
ground, Chinese direct investment in the countries
34

along the Belt and Road will increase faster and on a
broader scale.
Chart 1 Chinese direct investment in the countries along
the Belt and Road from 2003 to 2014
16000
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0

03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Amount of direct investment
(unit: million USD)

16.00%
14.00%
12.00%
10.00%
8.00%
6.00%
4.00%
2.00%
0.00%

Percentage in China’s overall outward
foreign direct investment

Source: Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment

1. 2 D e s t i nat i on c onc e nt r at i on w i t h
vulnerability to disturbance
Statistics from the Ministry of Commerce of
China reveals that Singapore, Russia, Indonesia and
Kazakhstan top the list of destinations for Chinese
direct investment to the countries along the Belt and
Road, claiming 43.1% of the total; the percentage
rises to 71.4% if we calculate the top 10 destinations.
In terms of risk diversification, excessive geographic
concentration is not a good choice. Data also shows
China has no direct investment in any of these six
countries; Bhutan, Armenia, Moldova, Estonia,
Montenegro and Slovenia, and moreover China
has negative investment figures in Latvia, Bahrain
and Syria, which means divestment or capital
withdrawal.
Table 1 China’s Direct Investments in the Countries
along the Belt and Road from 2003 to 2014 (unit: million
USD)
Country
Singapore
Russia

Stock of
direct
Country
investment
14312.69
Croatia
Bosnia and
5708.39
Herzegovina

Stock of
direct
investment
5.14
3.13
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Country
Indonesia

Stock of
direct
Country
investment
5646.85
The Maldives

Stock of
direct
investment
2.27

Kazakhstan

5374.41

Lebanon

1.21

Laos

3906.84

Albania

0.65

Myanmar

3390.66

Macedonia

0.06

Iran

3371.30

Palestine

0.04

Mongolia

3331.07

Latvia

－0.19

Thailand

3276.23

Bahrain

－1.94

Pakistan

3137.46

Syria

－7.20

Notes: The left column lists the top ten destinations for
investment, while the right column lists the bottom
ten.
Source: Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign
Direct Investment

Meanwhile, due to the complicated geopolitical
relations among the countries along the Belt and
Road and the frequent occurrence of emergencies,
Chinese direct investment could not be kept at a
stable level. For example, Syria, Bahrain, Oman,
Azerbaijan, Kuwait, Sri Lanka, and Turkmenistan
have seen drastic fluctuations of direct investments
from China.

Chart 2 Fluctuation of China’s direct investment in certain
countries along the Belt and Road from 2003 to 2014 (unit:
million USD)

Source: Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment

2. The existing rules and regulations
concerning China’s investment
cooperation with countries along
the Belt and Road
Considering the possible problems and risks in
investment cooperation during the advancement
of the Belt and Road Initiative, China is in need of
institutional guarantees and binding regulations. As
an initiative, the Belt and Road is not entitled to set
up a new mechanism for investment cooperation.
Instead, it can only utilize the existing investment
rules and try to coordinate investments at the
multilateral, regional and bilateral levels. In real
practice, however, it is still challenged by several
problems.
2.1 Lacking multilateral mechanism
There is not yet an international regulator for
international investments, nor a comprehensive
international agreement, which means that direct
investments in countries along the Belt and Road
lack effective coordinating mechanisms and
multilateral regulations. This makes international
investments in an embarrassed position compared
with international trade, which has permanent
multilateral organization (WTO, World Trade
Organization) and its agreements, such as the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),
and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). WTO and
its rules can be used to regulate and facilitate trade
cooperation among countries along the Belt and
Road.
While in FDI area, there are only a few
multilateral agreements in effect, which include
Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA), Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States (ICSID) and related
35
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agreements within the WTO framework (mainly
referring to Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures, or TRIMs for short). Among them,
MIGA aims to reduce political risks posed to
investments in developing countries, ICSID is meant
to settle investment disputes through mediation and
conciliation, while TRIMs only covers investment
measures that relate to trade in goods and limit or
distort trade (Li & Sang; 2014).
To all these treaties China is a signatory
country, which entitles China to directly use them
to strengthen investment cooperation with countries
along the Belt and Road, but only in a very limited
way. First, the initial purpose of these treaties is
to protect international investments involving
investment risks and barriers, but not mentioning
how to promote and encourage direct investment.
They are somehow at a lower stage, while current
multilateral trade rules have evolved from trade
protection and trade liberalization to a higher-level
of promotion and facilitation of trade, which is well
demonstrated by the Trade Facilitation Agreement.
Second, these treaties, incomplete and unsystematic,
only cover a small range of investment topics. A
large number of basic problems (such as national
treatment and most favored-nation treatment) and
other sensitive issues (such as national security
review, capital transfer and supervision) are yet
to be given standard solutions. Last, the binding
effectiveness and authority of the treaties are taken
with a pinch of salt. Take ICSID for example,
according to WB and ICSID statistics, from 1972
to 2015, only 549 cases were handed over to ICSID
for mediation or arbitration. That is a relatively
tiny number compared with large quantities of
investment disputes occurring each year, and of
those 549 cases there are only five cases in which

China as an investor turned to ICSID for help. The
fact that these established mechanisms turn out to be
underused indicates that there might be weaknesses
in these mechanisms, whose binding force and
effectiveness need to be further enhanced. To be
sure though, ICSID has its own influence, and 51
countries along the Belt and Road are its contracting
parties.① To some extent, it helps to guard against
FDI political risks.
Establishment of comprehensive multilateral
mechanisms has indeed been tried yet but ended in
failure. Whether it was the Multilateral Agreement
on Investment (MAI) of by the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
or WTO’s Multilateral Investment Framework
(MFI), these attempts proved to be a wild goose
chase (Xing, 2013). The United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) also made
efforts, for example, in its “World Investment
Report” to propose establishing a new-generation of
investment policies and investing in the SDGs: an
action plan, but these were all merely initiatives that
have no substantive binding enforcement. There are
other international treaties, which have been passed
but lack a binding power, such as the International
Code of Fair Treatment for Foreign Investments by
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), and
OECD’s Declaration on International Investment
and Multinational Enterprises; some treaties are
not ratified, such as the UN Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporations (Draft).
It is an embarrassed situation because of lack of
multilateral mechanisms, with only a few looselybinding treaties, yet limited in effect. The investment
cooperation among the Belt and Road requires a
comprehensive multilateral investment mechanism,
to provide guarantee by fundamental, universally

① There are ten non-contracting countries, including Bhutan, India, Iran, Laos, Maldives, Myanmar, Palestine, Poland, Tajikistan and Vietnam. Three countries,
i.e. Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Thailand have signed the treaty but not brought it into force.
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binding and authentic rules.
2.2 Restructuring regional rules
Regional investment treaties fall into two
categories. The first type targets direct investment,
such as the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement on
Investment (APTA Investment, cosigned by the
countries along the Belt and Road including China,
Bangladesh, Laos and Sri Lanka), and the ChinaASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) Investment
Agreement. The second type refers to trade treaties
with investment provisions, which is common in
nowadays trade negotiations (Lu & Sun, 2014).
Regional treaties along the Belt and Road are
scarce in quantity and limited in effect. First, regional
treaties do not hold enough binding power in settling
investment issues, especially in solving investment
disputes. For example, APTA Investment, although
passed in 2009, never came into effect. Second,
whether there are specific agreements concentrating
on direct investment or not, all regional treaties
tend to focus on trade and cover a very limited
range of contents on investment. Third, the existing
regional treaties cannot cover all countries along the
Belt and Road, which makes regional treaties less
applicable. Finally, the investment issues covered
by the treaties are at a low level and lag behind
the new international rules. The Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) features several investment topics
that are leading the path of building new investment
rules, such as competitive neutrality, investor-state
dispute settlement mechanisms, and labor and
environmental standards (Wen, 2016). As for treaties
signed by the countries along the Belt and Road,
RCEP might be the only one that is up to date, but
still in negotiation. The high standards of the TPP
is not feasible for RCEP due to the diversification of
the RCEP countries. For example, the investor-state
dispute settlement mechanism is in fact not suitable
for the countries along the Belt and Road, or rather,
too high to achieve. Foreign investors are permitted

to sue the government of the host country, and it is
obviously favorable for multinational companies
from developed countries, but not in any way helpful
for the governments of the developing countries.
It is not in accordance with the mutual benefit and
win-win philosophy pursued by the Belt and Road
Initiative. Therefore, it is inevitable that the new
investment rules should be customized, designed
and adopted based on the cooperative ideas and
practical needs of the Belt and Road Initiative in
order to fit specific local conditions.
Some beneficial attempts have been made by
the countries along the Belt and Road. For example,
the AIIB, compared with the WB and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), is lean, clean and green.
What’s more, it adheres to the principle of achieving
mutual benefit and a win-win outcome, and never
imposes harsh political clauses upon investment
projects or the host countries of investment. In
some sense many AIIB principles and measures
are advancing the reform of financial development
agencies, causing pressure upon original financial
investment cooperation mechanisms and adding
impetus to the investment cooperation. Given that
it was established years before, the AIIB is yet to be
tested by practice.
There are two challenges facing the regional
investment treaties or mechanisms. The first is
the reconstruction of rules, namely figuring out
how to integrate the practical needs with the new
international rules and achieve high-standard
investment treaties. The second challenge is to
implement concrete measures to make the AIIB
work more effectively and push the investment
projects that could yield mutual benefits and a winwin outcome to break ground.
2.3 Requiring upgrade of BITs
Bilateral cooperative mechanisms include BIT
and the Avoidance of Double Taxation Treaty (DTT).
BIT is currently the most important and effective
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mechanism for investment cooperation. China has
already signed BITs with 56 countries along the Belt
and Road.① DTT, on the other hand, helps to reduce
the tax burdens of those enterprises that invest in
foreign countries. So far China has signed DTTs
with 53 countries along the Belt and Road.②
Backdropped by the lack of multilateral
mechanisms and the reconstruction of regional
rules, BIT becomes the most effective investment
rule that China can rely on when advancing the Belt
and Road Initiative. However, problems still exist
in the BITs signed by China and the countries along
the Belt and Road. First, the low outdated of those
BITs, mostly signed in the 1990s, cannot satisfy
nowadays requirements. China began to engage
in BIT negotiation long time ago, but at that point
China had just begun its undertaking of outward
foreign direct investment and did not have urgent
demand for BIT. Worse still, some BITs, such as
those China signed with Brunei and Jordan, never
come into effect. Currently the latest version of BIT
in the world is the 2012 US BIT template, which
has high-standard investment protection and highlevel openness to investment, characterized by the
management model of pre-establishment national
treatment and negative list (Nie, 2014). In contrast,
the BITs signed between China and countries
along the Belt and Road countries mainly focus on
protecting foreign investments in China, at a low
level of protection, with little liberalization and
facilitation, and with no pre-establishment national
treatment and negative list. Second, these BITs only
apply to a narrow scope and are time -consuming.
BIT literally only applies to bilateral level. To reach
such agreements with so many countries there must

have been a painstaking process, not to mention
that all these BITs today have to be resigned. The
cost of future negotiations might become a burden.
Third, overlapping and conflicting content tends
to cause administrative confusion. So many BITs,
signed by numerous countries with complex
contents, would easily result in the “Spaghetti bowl
effect”, which may be troublesome for investment
supervision and international coordination, makes
it difficult for foreign investors to abide by the laws,
and is not good for solving FDI disputes through
internationally standardized methods. Last, BIT is
yet to be signed between China and some unstable
countries, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Nepal and
East Timor, in order to provide guarantee for the
interests of Chinese enterprises’ investment in these
countries.
In FDI area, BIT is currently the best practice,
which provides a solid guarantee for the promotion
of the investment cooperation with the countries
along the Belt and Road at the bilateral level. But
given their outdated model and provisions, the BITs
need to be upgraded and resigned.

3. Policy suggestions
Currently the international investment rules
are at a key historical moment, where the outdated
need to make way for the new, and China needs
to make more active and innovative efforts to get
involved. The Belt and Road Initiative needs more
detailed guidelines for investment cooperation and
more pragmatic investment rules to guarantee FDI
interests.
3.1 To propose FDI cooperation guidelines for

① Countries along the Belt and Road not yet signing BIT with China include eight countries, i.e. Afghanistan, Bhutan, East Timor, Iraq, Maldives, Montenegro,
Nepal and Palestine. Data source: UNCTAD (http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/).
② Countries along the Belt and Road not yet signing DTT with China include 11 countries, i.e. Afghanistan, Bhutan, East Timor, Iraq, Maldives, Palestine,
Cambodia, Jordan, Lebanon, Myanmar and Yemen. Data source: State Administration of Taxation of China (http://www.Chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810770/
index.html).
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BRI
As an initiative, the Belt and Road is flexible
in some ways, and the principles guidelines for
investment could be further specified. A set of
guidelines on investment cooperation with the
countries along the Belt and Road, without the hassle
of building a new institution or a new mechanism,
would be a good option. But the key problem for
that would be how to establish guidelines and
principles, and how to guarantee the interests of
China and maximize the holistic interest inside the
area along the Belt and Road. The guidelines for
investment cooperation are supposed to be based on
the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building the Silk
Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime
Silk Road, and the contents should include industrial
complementary openness, disputes settlement
through friendly negotiations and risk control.
In 2016, G20 Guiding Principles on Global
Investment Policymaking was adopted, which is
a good example for BRI. The guidelines for the
investment cooperation are in nature not legally
binding, but since BRI brings mutual benefits and
win-win outcomes, the guidelines are likely to
play a significant demonstration role. When more
investment projects are implemented, and a winwin outcome is achieved, those guidelines will
become more convincing, and there might even
be a chance that the Belt and Road could begin to
build functional mechanisms or institutions for its
investment cooperation.
Admittedly, only guidelines are far from enough.
The Belt and Road Initiative needs to convince
people with morality and integrity, with feasible
investment rules that yield mutual benefits and a
win-win outcome. Therefore, implementation of the
rules is the very key, and integration, upgrading and
renewal of investment rules should be conducted at
the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels.
3.2 Multilaterally to propose global FDI rules

and long-term mechanism
The ideal goal at the multilateral level would
be to set up a global coordinating institution for
investment, just like the WTO, and build a set
of rules that could work worldwide. To that end,
China should first focus on building comprehensive
global investment guidelines or rules that cater to
the common needs of all the countries based on
the original MAI and MFI, and it must adhere to
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) during the
rule-making. However, given the difficulty and
workload, it could not be accomplished in a short
term. Therefore, a second-best choice would be
to fully leverage the existing MIGA and ICSID.
Many countries along the Belt and Road have
higher possibilities of political risks, and China
must make the best use of the current risk guarantee
mechanisms, dispute settlement mechanisms, and
international organizations or treaties to protect
the interest of Chinese enterprises’ overseas
investments.
3.3 Regionally to innovate rules by methods
of RCEP and AIIB
Regional investment rules have witnessed
dramatic change. Compared with the developed
countries, China is a newcomer, whether in theories
or in practices, and needs to catch up. On one hand,
China should closely study the TPP’s contents
about investment, continuously innovate investment
issues in the FTA, and make down-to-earth efforts
to propose feasible clauses. Not all but some new
rules could be employed, for example, the labor and
environmental standards, competitive neutrality and
investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms. But
during the rule-making and the implementation,
it is necessary to appropriately adapt and lower
standards to cater to the diversity of countries
along the Belt and Road and the actual needs of the
investment cooperation. On the other hand, some
current regional mechanisms or institutions could
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be used by China during the investment cooperation
with countries along the Belt and Road, especially
the RCEP and the AIIB. Courageous attempts can
be made within the region, and China can gain the
initiative and right of speech.
3.4 Bilaterally to upgrade BITs and promote
liberalization and facilitation
Bilateral-level breakthroughs are the most
obligatory and easiest to make. China can quicken its
efforts to upgrade the investment agreements signed
with countries along the Belt and Road and strive to
develop new-generation agreements. The goal is not
only to protect direct investments, but also to boost
and facilitate them, and more importantly, to quicken
the pace of opening and liberalizing the investment
industry (Ma, 2015).
Given the risks posed to the investments in
countries along the Belt and Road, on one hand,
China must fully leverage BITs’ strength to guard
against political risks and use the current rules
to safeguard the interests of China’s overseas
investments. On the other hand, the facilitation
and liberalization of BITs should be propelled,
the construction of coordinating mechanisms for
investment promotion must be quickened, and
attempts must be made in practice to expand
access to the investment industries by China and its
counterparts.
The diversity of countries along the Belt and
Road also requires that BIT upgrading be performed
at a stable pace according to their specific national
attributes. So it is the same with the high-standard
investment clauses. Though the management
model for “pre-establishment national treatment
plus negative list” is the trend, it cannot be rashly
implemented by the countries along the Belt and
Road, as most countries are developing countries,
not to mention that China’s new rules are in the
experiment. An option is to pilot this development
model with some more developed countries along
40

the Belt and Road. Considering the risks posed to
investments, it is advisable that the investor-state
dispute settlement mechanism be introduced, if
fairness and rationality can be guaranteed and the
interests of the large number of developing countries
can be taken into full considerations.
3.5 Unilaterally to deepen domestic reform
and pilot new rules
Domestic political reforms are necessary for
the construction of international rules. China will
definitelycontinue its innovation in investment
management systems, experiment FTZ new policies
and integrate with new international rules (Shi,
2015). As an old Chinese saying goes, “Those who
govern must first be self-governed, those who blame
others must first blame themselves, and those who
contribute must first be capable enough.,” if China
wants to participate in the making of international
investment rules, and to build investment standards
for the Belt and Road that could meet the interests
of China and all the other stakeholders, China must
make itself a role model first by implementing highstandard investment rules inside its territory. On
one hand, the “pre-establishment national treatment
and negative list” model needs to be progressively
implemented for foreign investments in China, and
the negative list should be cut shorter and shorter.
On the other hand, the management mechanism for
overseas investments should be established, where
automatic registration, other than administrative
approval, plays a major role. China is to improve
supervision during the whole process of the
investment, and reduce administrative intervention.
Only when it becomes a role model in implementing
the new rules can China be able to take the initiative
to guide the cooperation and adopt relevant rules to
achieve a win-win outcome during its investment
cooperation with countries along the Belt and Road..
(Translator: Wu Lingwei; Editor: Xiong Xianwei)
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